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Friday, February 22, 2008

The Other Side of The Hill

This is Steven Petrick Posting.

"The Other Side Of The Hill" is a term that applies to "The Fog of War". It refers to the fact that while you, as a commander, are standing on a piece of terrain, you can see what is going on around you, but you cannot see over an intervening piece of terrain. So while you can see that the enemy is entrenched on that hill over there, you do not have any idea what is behind that hill.

The same applies to your opponent, who can see that you are massing troops to attack a part of his line, but has no idea if that is going to be your main effort, or if you are massing troops behind that hill to attack somewhere else once he reacts to the feint.

As war gamers we often get too used to the idea of knowing exactly what our opponent is doing, or at least what he can do. And a lot of things that are easy to do in a game are hard to do, or impossible to do, in real life. For Example, if you are playing a game about the Russian Front, and you see a weak point in the Soviet lines that you want to attack, but have no nearby forces to attack with. You do have six divisions that are 10 hexes north of the weak point, and six divisions that are 10 hexes south of the weak point. It would take two turns to move those divisions to the point of attack. Movement that would telegraph your plans to the Soviets. So the opportunity is lost. Not so. You move the divisions half as far as they would normally, then move them into the front lines, relieving the divisions that are already there, which then move north (or south as appropriate) relieving the next divisions in line and so on. You have thus converted the 16 divisions that too far away into 12 divisions poised at the point of attack (sure, they are not the same 12 divisions, but they are 12 divisions). And you have effectively moved these divisions in zero time (you did not need two turns to bring the divisions, you just shuffled them), so you are launching the attack on the same turn that you noticed the weakness.

In real life such shuffling of divisions would be impossible, and your enemy would notice this "unusual activity" across his front in more than adequate time to figure out what you were doing (and exploit the inevitable confusion in your own ranks such shuffling across his front would create).

The point to all this is the when judging a combat, always remember that most commanders have had to make their decisions on very little information about what their enemy was doing. If you play a game about "The Battle of The Bulge", you already know, before the first counter is moved and the first die is rolled, that the Germans are going to be attacking the Americans. If you play a game of Gettysburg, you already know that the Harry Heth's Confederate Division will come marching from the West towards Gettysburg on July First and you will have the Union Cavalry Brigades of Devin and Gamble under General Buford to stop him initially, but Reynolds' I Corps is on the way and you know just when he will arrive.

Wars are not fought with perfect knowledge. Whether you are the ranking commander of a Nation's maximum military effort, or the lowliest squad leader in direct combat, you are always going to be wondering "what is on the other side of that hill?"