The Rest of the Story
This is Steven Petrick Posting:
I grew up and was mostly taught that during the American Civil War Confederate Cavalry was superior to Union Cavalry in the first few years of the war simply because the Confederates were better horsemen. This was just one of those "accepted wisdoms". Thus the Union horsemen were totally unable to match J.E.B. Stuart's riders when they rode around the Army of the Potomac before the "Seven Days Battles". Nor were they able to stand up to the Confederate cavalry in skirmishes.
While it was the accepted wisdom, somewhere about the time I reached my mid-20s the accepted wisdom had begun to bother me. Something just had to be wrong. While much was made about the idea that Southern boys spent more time in the saddle, and would ride to the hounds (chasing foxes), that was largely the pastime of the landed aristocracy of the South. Northern boys also came from farms and spent time riding on a par with the majority of the Southern small farmers, and the majority of both spent little time riding at all. The townsfolk of both sides certainly spent little time in the saddle.
The upshot was that something was clearly wrong. The "human material" out of which both sides would build their cavalry units was not different enough to account for the differences in capabilities. Further, both drew their officers from a common pool of instruction and basic tactical doctrine, and both seemed equally motivated for the causes they were fighting for (Union versus State's Rights).
Something else had to be going on.
Something was.
The major fault was a difference in doctrine, and a failure of foresight.
The Union leadership had drawn the conclusion that the state of weapons at the start of the war was such that Cavalry would be ineffective in its historical roles. Close, but no cigar as the saying goes. The rifled musket, rifled cannons, and brass cannons were certainly leading the way to Horse Cavalry's removal from the field (although this process would not be complete until after World War II). The upshot of this visionary decision was that the Union actually stopped recruiting Cavalry regiments during the first year of the Civil War. This led to the South actually having more cavalry regiments than the Union had on any given battle field, and left Union armies with insufficient Cavalry for screening its flanks and blunting the operations of Confederate Cavalry.
The difference in doctrine was that the Confederacy (particularly in its most successful army under its most famous Cavalry commander) consolidated its cavalry under one commander almost from the start of the war, while in the North, most Cavalry regiments were either independent organizations or were sub elements of nominally "infantry" brigades. The result was a further dilution of the already understrength (as percentage of all arms) Cavalry forces.
The upshot was that for most of the first year and half of the Civil War Union Cavalry was consistently and hopelessly outnumbered (even though Union Cavalry regiments were authorized more troops than the opposing Confederate regiments) by its Confederate counterparts, and even when near equal numbers might be present, the divided command relationship prevented real cooperation.
When the Union began organizing additional regiments of cavalry and consolidating them into Brigade and Division formations, the ascendancy of Confederate Cavalry soon faded from the scene even before the privations imposed on Confederate troops laid them even further low.
I grew up and was mostly taught that during the American Civil War Confederate Cavalry was superior to Union Cavalry in the first few years of the war simply because the Confederates were better horsemen. This was just one of those "accepted wisdoms". Thus the Union horsemen were totally unable to match J.E.B. Stuart's riders when they rode around the Army of the Potomac before the "Seven Days Battles". Nor were they able to stand up to the Confederate cavalry in skirmishes.
While it was the accepted wisdom, somewhere about the time I reached my mid-20s the accepted wisdom had begun to bother me. Something just had to be wrong. While much was made about the idea that Southern boys spent more time in the saddle, and would ride to the hounds (chasing foxes), that was largely the pastime of the landed aristocracy of the South. Northern boys also came from farms and spent time riding on a par with the majority of the Southern small farmers, and the majority of both spent little time riding at all. The townsfolk of both sides certainly spent little time in the saddle.
The upshot was that something was clearly wrong. The "human material" out of which both sides would build their cavalry units was not different enough to account for the differences in capabilities. Further, both drew their officers from a common pool of instruction and basic tactical doctrine, and both seemed equally motivated for the causes they were fighting for (Union versus State's Rights).
Something else had to be going on.
Something was.
The major fault was a difference in doctrine, and a failure of foresight.
The Union leadership had drawn the conclusion that the state of weapons at the start of the war was such that Cavalry would be ineffective in its historical roles. Close, but no cigar as the saying goes. The rifled musket, rifled cannons, and brass cannons were certainly leading the way to Horse Cavalry's removal from the field (although this process would not be complete until after World War II). The upshot of this visionary decision was that the Union actually stopped recruiting Cavalry regiments during the first year of the Civil War. This led to the South actually having more cavalry regiments than the Union had on any given battle field, and left Union armies with insufficient Cavalry for screening its flanks and blunting the operations of Confederate Cavalry.
The difference in doctrine was that the Confederacy (particularly in its most successful army under its most famous Cavalry commander) consolidated its cavalry under one commander almost from the start of the war, while in the North, most Cavalry regiments were either independent organizations or were sub elements of nominally "infantry" brigades. The result was a further dilution of the already understrength (as percentage of all arms) Cavalry forces.
The upshot was that for most of the first year and half of the Civil War Union Cavalry was consistently and hopelessly outnumbered (even though Union Cavalry regiments were authorized more troops than the opposing Confederate regiments) by its Confederate counterparts, and even when near equal numbers might be present, the divided command relationship prevented real cooperation.
When the Union began organizing additional regiments of cavalry and consolidating them into Brigade and Division formations, the ascendancy of Confederate Cavalry soon faded from the scene even before the privations imposed on Confederate troops laid them even further low.
posted by Federation Commander at 2:00 PM
<< Home